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ABSTRACT
In this paper I explore a new approach to the ethics of animal ex-
perimentation by conceiving of it as a form of rescue. The notion of 
rescue, I suggest, involves some moral agent(s) performing an action 
or series of actions, whose end is to prevent or alleviate serious harm 
to another party, harm that otherwise would have occurred or would 
have continued to occur, had that moral agent not intervened. Animal 
experiments that are utilized as a means to alleviate human illnesses 
mirror the structure of rescue cases and this means that we can and 
should apply principles of rescue to illuminate the moral status of 
animal experimentation. To do this I consider various principles of 
rescue that might justify animal experimentation. I’ll argue that all 
of these rescue principles are either not independently plausible, or 
else they fail to imply that animal experimentation is morally justi-
fied. This suggests that it is quite difficult to morally justify animal 
experimentation when conceived as a form of rescue.
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 1. Introduction
Although the phrase ”animal experimentation” covers a 
large swathe of scientific and medical practices, in this paper 
the term will be used to refer to only those animal experiments 
that are performed exclusively as a means to curing or alle-
viating painful and debilitating human diseases and illnesses. 
Typically, the principal argument put forth in favor of this kind 
of animal experimentation is known as the Benefits Argument 
(both Bass 2012, 85 and Regan 2012 confer this status on the 
Benefits Argument; see Cohen 2006 for a classic statement of 
the argument). Roughly, the Benefits Argument claims that an-
imal experimentation is morally justified because the benefits 
of animal experimentation for human health and longevity are 
enormous, and that they outweigh the harms on animals pro-
duced by the practice of animal experimentation. Furthermore, 
since the results of animal research generally give us reliable 
information that we can apply to treat human beings and since 
there are no better alternatives to animal experimentation that 
might lead us to cure various human diseases and illnesses, it 
follows that animal experimentation is morally justified. 
While the Benefits Argument is the single most cited ar-
gument in favor of animal experimentation, there are roughly 
three popular approaches that attempt to undermine the moral 
legitimacy of animal experimentation. Some follow Regan 
(1983, 2012) by arguing that all animal experimentation, in-
cluding the kind used for substantive human benefits, is wrong 
because such experiments violate the moral rights of the ani-
mals being used. Others follow Singer’s Utilitarian approach 
(1974, 1975), according to which, since animal pain and plea-
sure matter morally, animal experiments that fail to result in 
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an optimal balance of pain and pleasure are wrong.1 Finally, 
others, who take what I call the Skeptical Approach, question 
the scientific merits of animal experimentation by pointing out 
that the medical intelligence gleaned from animal experiments 
does not give us information that is reliable for treating human 
beings (see Engel 2012). For example, certain doses of Isuprel, 
an asthma drug, were found to be safe during animal trials. As 
a result of this information, 3,500 asthma patients who took the 
allegedly safe dosage of Isuprel died (Greek and Greek 2000, 
63). Another example is Clioquinol, an antidiarrheal drug that 
was tested safe in rats, cats, dogs, and rabbits. As a result of the 
information gleaned from animal trials, Clioquinol was used 
by humans and was found to cause blindness and paralysis in 
many patients (Ibid., 67; see also Greek and Greek 2004; Engel 
Jr 2012). Thus, according to this approach, animal experiments 
should not be performed because what we learn from these ex-
periments is likely not a reliable guide to alleviating human 
diseases and illnesses.  
Instead of focusing on the above approaches, my plan in this 
paper is to explore a completely new approach to the morality 
of animal experimentation. In order to get a handle on whether 
animal experimentation is in fact morally justified, I propose 
that we view animal experimentation as a form of rescue. Ani-
mal experiments, I’ll suggest, mirror the structure of rescue 
cases and this means that we can and should apply principles 
of rescue to animal experimentation. Approaching the ethics 
of animal experimentation via the rescue approach has certain 
advantages over the current, major approaches to the ethics of 
1  Although Singer’s preferred version of Utilitarianism is Preference-
Utilitarianism, mainly for ease of discussion I have stated the Utilitar-
ian approach in terms of the classic, hedonic version of the theory. 
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animal experimentation. First, since many proponents of ani-
mal experimentation deny or find implausible the idea that ani-
mals have rights (e.g. Cohen 1986), appealing to the rights of 
animals, as Regan (1983, 2012) does, is not a moral consider-
ation that many people, especially proponents of animal exper-
imentation, will find plausible. The rescue approach, however, 
is silent on whether animals have rights. Instead, it puts forth 
general principles of rescue that are applicable regardless of 
whether animals have rights. Second, many find implausible 
the Utilitarian approach to animal experimentation because 
they find Utilitarianism to be a flawed moral theory (see Engel 
Jr. 2012). Thus, many might be inclined to outright reject the 
Utilitarian approach simply because they believe that Utilitari-
anism, as a moral theory, is hopelessly flawed. Since the rescue 
approach is independent of any heavy-duty moral theory, it has 
a better chance of avoiding the theoretical problems that many 
find with Utilitarianism and other moral theories. Finally, the 
rescue approach does not deny that at least some experiments 
on animals can give us medical intelligence that can be used 
to cure or alleviate human diseases and illnesses. It thus has a 
dialectical advantage over the Skeptical Approach by not deny-
ing the scientific credibility of animal experiments and being 
open to the possibility that at least some animal experiments 
can give us valuable information to aid human health and well-
being.  
The question I am interested in answering, then, is this: is 
animal experimentation a morally justified instance of rescue? 
The answer to this question, I’ll suggest, depends on whether 
there is an independently plausible principle of rescue that en-
tails that animal experimentation is morally justified. 
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In the next section, I’ll discuss some preliminary assump-
tions. Next, in §3, I’ll argue that animal experimentation can be 
viewed as a form of rescue and I’ll discuss several principles of 
rescue that might justify animal experimentation. In this sec-
tion, I’ll show that all of the rescue principles I consider are 
either not independently plausible, or else they fail to entail 
that animal experimentation is morally justified. This discus-
sion will show just how difficult it is to state and defend an 
independently plausible principle of rescue that also justifies 
the practice of animal experimentation. In the final section, 
I’ll put forth two principles that I believe have the best chance 
of morally justifying animal experimentation; however, as I’ll 
show, these principles are unacceptable because they depend 
on the implausible claim that species membership, by itself, 
makes the interests of one species weightier than the interests 
of other species. 
2. Preliminaries
Before I discuss the notion of rescue and how animal experi-
mentation can be viewed as a form of rescue, I will begin by 
making some plausible assumptions. 
First, there are a number of pro-animal experimentation po-
sitions one can take, ranging from the extreme pro-research 
position that all animal experimentation is justified because 
animal interests do not matter morally, all the way to the abo-
litionist position that no animal experiments are ever morally 
justified, perhaps because animals have moral rights that can-
not be overridden, even to increase net utility (see Regan 1983; 
Francione 2008). For the purposes of this paper, I will be as-
suming what Baruch Brody (2012) has called the “reasonable 
pro-research position,” which is captured by the following four 
claims:
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(1) Animals have interests (at least in not suffering, 
and perhaps others as well), which may be ad-
versely affected either by research performed on 
them or by the conditions under which they live 
before, during, and after the research; 
(2) The adverse effect on animals’ interests is mor-
ally relevant, and must be taken into account when 
deciding whether or not a particular program of 
animal research is justified or must be modified or 
abandoned; 
(3) The justification for conducting a research pro-
gram on animals that would adversely affect them 
is the benefits that human beings would receive 
from the research in question; 
(4) In deciding whether or not the research in ques-
tion is justified, human interests should be given 
greater significance than animal interests. (Brody 
2012, 54) 
When I speak of the reasonable pro-experimentation po-
sition in this paper, I have in mind the position composed of 
claims (1)-(4) or a set of similar claims. Assuming the most 
reasonable pro-experimentation position as a starting point 
will aid my discussion on the notion of rescue and how it can 
be utilized to explore the morality of animal experimentation.  
Second, we need to make an assumption about whether 
animal and human pain are comparable or whether they are 
incommensurate. It is certainly open to the reasonable pro-ex-
perimentation position to accept that human pain and pleasure 
and animal pain and pleasure are incommensurate. But the in-
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commensurability claim seems to be in serious tension with 
the reasonable pro-experimentation position. For if animal and 
human interests are incommensurate, then the obvious account 
of their incommensurability is to say that human pain and suf-
fering is lexically prior to animal pain and suffering. But if 
human pain and suffering is lexically prior to animal pain and 
suffering, it’s hard to see how any harmful animal experiment 
performed for even trivial human benefit can ever be unjusti-
fied. But surely given the pro-experimentation position’s com-
mitment to claims (1) and (2), there are at least some possible 
experiments, e.g. those that promise almost no substantive hu-
man benefits but a great deal of animal pain, that the reasonable 
pro-experimentation position should count as impermissible. 
So I think that a reasonable assumption is that human pain 
and pleasure are comparable to animal pain and pleasure. After 
all, as Brody (2012) and others have pointed out, the dimen-
sions by which we measure human pain and pleasure – such as 
intensity and duration -- seem perfectly applicable with respect 
to measuring animal pain and suffering. We seem able, then, to 
compare instances of human pain and pleasure to instances of 
animal pain and suffering, and weigh them accordingly. 
Finally, since the notion of rescue is usually discussed as 
a duty or obligation of rescue (as in Singer 1972; Savulescu 
2007; Rulli & Millum 2014), it is important to get clear on what 
the reasonable pro-experimentation position should say about 
the moral status of performing animal experiments. Are ani-
mal experiments merely morally permissible, or are they mor-
ally obligatory? Some pro-experimentation advocates seem to 
think that animal experimentation is a moral obligation (Cohen 
1986), but the pro-experimentation position need not take such 
a hard stance. What the pro-experimentation position should 
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say – and what I’ll be assuming for the rest of the paper -- is 
that animal experimentation is a morally permissible practice; 
that is, it’s neither obligatory nor impermissible. 
Let’s now turn to the notion of rescue and to the question 
of whether there are any independently plausible principles of 
rescue that also entail that animal experimentation is morally 
permissible. 
3. Rescue and Animal Experimentation
The notion of recue has received relatively little attention 
in the contemporary ethics discourse (although for recent ap-
plications of the notion of rescue in other areas of practical eth-
ics, see Boylan 2006; Savulescu 2007; Rulli and Millum 2014; 
Schmidtz 2000; Snyder 2009). This is especially the case with 
respect to animal ethics. Despite this, rescue seems to be a per-
vasive feature of our moral lives. Daily, we encounter situa-
tions where we are in a position to rescue a person or some oth-
er morally considerable being.  We can choose to donate some 
of our money to charities that will provide people the resources 
they need to avoid succumbing to deadly diseases or escape the 
plight of famine (see Singer 1972 and 2009a). Similarly, all of 
us are faced with the choice of becoming organ donors after 
we die. Since our donated organs can save people from death 
at little or no cost to ourselves, it is quite plausible to see organ 
donation as a form of rescue (Hester 2006; Snyder 2009). 
Other times, we choose to risk our health and safety to help 
another person in need. For example, we might encounter a 
mob of people attacking an innocent stranger; in these circum-
stances we must decide whether we should intervene to prevent 
physical and emotional harm to the person being attacked, even 
when doing so would put our own welfare at risk. Additionally, 
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in some professional contexts, rescue holds a prominent, even 
central place: fire-fighters are sometimes required to rescue in-
nocent people from burning or collapsing buildings, while po-
lice officers are required to come to the aid of people in danger 
of serious harm or death (Rulli and Millum 2014).
Given the above examples, what seems essential to the no-
tion of rescue is some moral agent(s) performing an action or 
series of actions, whose end is to prevent or alleviate serious 
harm to another party, harm that otherwise would have oc-
curred or would have continued to occur, had that moral agent 
not intervened. Furthermore, the rescue cases of interest for 
this paper involve moral agents who are not responsible for the 
harm affecting the party in need of rescue. This is because the 
researchers performing animal experiments in order to allevi-
ate human ailments are not responsible for the diseases and 
ailments that they are attempting to cure or alleviate. We could, 
however, imagine possible circumstances in which, say, a sci-
entist infects a person with a particular disease. In that case, the 
scientist’s duties of rescue towards that person will be radically 
different from the duties that apply in standard cases in which 
the rescuer is not responsible for the plight of the rescuee. 
It is quite plausible that animal experimentation (as we are 
using the term) mirrors the essential structure of rescue out-
lined above.  Since the goal of animal experimentation, as I 
am using the term, is to glean information that is essential 
in curing terrible and debilitating diseases that inflict human 
beings, what we are doing when we experiment on animals 
is attempting to rescue human beings from diseases and ill-
nesses, thereby preventing or alleviating serious harm or death 
that would have occurred had the animal experiments not been 
performed. Just as diving into a pool is a necessary part of 
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rescuing an innocent person from drowning, the experiments 
we perform on animals are, let’s assume, a necessary step in 
rescuing human beings from diseases and illnesses that they 
suffer from.
Principles of Rescue and Animal Experimentation
To begin, consider the two most famous principles of rescue, 
both put forth by Peter Singer (1972) in his influential paper, 
“Famine Affluence, and Morality”: 
(i) If it is in our power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to 
do it.
(ii) If it is in our power to prevent something very bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything 
morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. (Singer 
1972)
Given our assumption that animal experimentation is mor-
ally permissible and not obligatory, we need to tweak Singer’s 
principles to reflect this position. Consider, then, the second 
principle, properly reformulated: 
(RP): If it is in our power to prevent something very 
bad from happening, it is morally permissible to do it, 
unless doing so sacrifices something morally signifi-
cant.
Imagine you standing at a bus stop and you see an elderly 
man about to unknowingly walk into incoming traffic. Given 
your position on the sidewalk and your above-average physical 
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strength, you can easily and safely grab the man by the arm and 
pull him to safety, which would prevent him from being hit and 
severely injured by the incoming traffic. In this imaginary case, 
it is clearly permissible for you to grab the man by the arm and 
pull him to safety; grabbing him by the arm and pulling him to 
safety does not sacrifice anything morally significant. 
But what does this principle entail about animal experimen-
tation? Since the pro- experimentation position is committed to 
animal pain and suffering mattering morally, (RP) straightfor-
wardly entails that animal experimentation is impermissible. It 
is impermissible because performing animal experimentation 
sacrifices something morally significant, i.e. it causes pain and 
suffering to animals, something the pro-experimentation posi-
tion admits as mattering morally.  
Despite this implication, proponents of the pro-experimen-
tation position can rest easy because (RP) is not independently 
plausible. This is easy to show by considering the following 
case. Imagine you promise your friend that you will meet her 
for coffee at 3pm, but on the way to the coffee house you en-
counter a drowning child in a shallow pond. If you save the 
child, you won’t be able to make the coffee-date thereby break-
ing your promise, and furthermore, you do not have enough 
time to tell your friend about the ordeal that has befallen you. 
Despite this, it is quite clear that it is permissible to save the 
child and break the promise to your friend, even though break-
ing a promise is morally significant. Therefore, (RP) is false 
and thus cannot be used to show that animal experimentation 
is morally impermissible. 
We need, it seems, a stronger principle. Therefore, let’s now 
consider Singer’s first principle, properly reformulated: 
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(RP2): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, it is morally permissible to do it, un-
less doing so sacrifices something of comparable mor-
al importance.
Notice that, according to (RP2), an instance of rescue is im-
permissible if the rescuer sacrifices something of comparable 
moral importance. This means that whatever is sacrificed by 
the experiment (e.g. animal pain) need not be of equal moral 
importance to the potential benefits of the experiment; it just 
must be of comparable importance. But what does it mean for 
one thing, x, to be comparably morally important to another 
thing, y? Does it mean that x must be in principle compara-
ble—and not incommensurate—to y? In that case, the animal 
pain resulting from a particular harmful experiment would 
be of comparable moral importance to the human pain gener-
ated by the diseases we are attempting to cure by engaging in 
the experiments. However, although saying that x and y are in 
principle comparable is a necessary condition on x being of 
comparable moral importance to y, it can’t be the whole story. 
Here is Singer’s gloss on the phrase: 
By “without sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance” I mean without causing anything else 
comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is 
wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, 
comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can 
prevent. (Singer 1972, 231) 
Given this interpretation, it is easy to show that (RP2) en-
tails that animal experimentation is impermissible. Consider 
any harmful experiment on an animal. Imagine, for example, 
that researchers must crush the spines of some rabbits in order 
AlexAnder ZAmbrAno
64
© Between the Species, 2016
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/
Vol. 19, Issue 1
to find out something that might help cure a particular spinal 
disease in humans. In that case, crushing the spines of the rab-
bits seems to be something that is wrong in itself: if you found 
out that your neighbor, for example, was engaging in the crush-
ing of rabbit spines, you would be horrified and outraged by 
such a cruel practice. Thus, if we follow Singer’s understand-
ing of the notion of comparable moral importance, it follows 
from (RP2) that the particular experiment in question is imper-
missible. Notice, too, that this result is compatible with claim 
(4) of the reasonable pro-experimentation position. 
But is (RP2) an independently plausible principle? It is not. 
Imagine that two of your friends are drowning in a pool and 
you can only successfully save one of them from drowning. 
Most of us believe that it is permissible to save either friend. 
But accepting (RP2) entails that it is impermissible to save ei-
ther one! This is because rescuing one friend entails letting the 
other friend die. And surely the life of the friend that ends up 
drowning is of comparable moral importance to the life of the 
friend that you end up saving. Thus, even while (RP2) may give 
us the result that animal experimentation is impermissible, it is 
not an independently plausible principle. 
The failure of (RP2) suggests that it is too strong. We thus 
need a weaker principle that avoids the implausible implication 
above. Consider:
(RP3): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, it is morally permissible to do it, un-
less doing it sacrifices something of greater moral sig-
nificance. 
(RP3) avoids the drowning friend counter-example to (RP2) 
and seems to have a much better chance of securing the permis-
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sibility of animal experimentation. For even if we assume that 
animal pain and pleasure are of comparable moral importance 
to human pain and pleasure, it does not follow that animal pain 
and pleasure are equally morally significant as human pain and 
pleasure. In fact, given claim (4), the pro-experimentation po-
sition can maintain that all else being equal, animal pain and 
pleasure are of lesser moral weight than human pain and plea-
sure. Call this the greater weight principle. To illustrate, con-
sider a case in which an animal and a human are experiencing 
the same pain (say, the forceful poke of a needle). Given the 
greater weight principle, the pain experienced by the human 
being is of greater moral weight than the pain experienced by 
the animal. 
Thus, accepting (RP3) entails that it is permissible to per-
form a given animal experiment, so long as the harm done to 
animals is not of greater moral weight than the benefits to hu-
man beings. Furthermore, given the greater weight principle, 
since the cases of animal experimentation we are considering 
are ones in which painful experiments are performed on ani-
mals for significant human benefits such as the curing of dis-
eases, illnesses, and the alleviation of pain, it is plausible to 
believe that the animal pain involved in many of these experi-
ments is not of greater moral weight than the benefits gotten by 
curing or curtailing human ailments that cause a good deal of 
pain and suffering. Given these considerations, it’s plausible 
that an application of (RP3) entails that at least some cases of 
animal experimentation are permissible. 
The problem, however, is that (RP3) is false. Consider the 
following case:
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The Riot2. Bob is the sheriff of a small town in which 
racial tension is always high. One day he receives re-
port of an alleged rape of a white woman by an Afri-
can-American male. News of the rape triggers a city 
wide riot, resulting in many injuries, deaths, and de-
stroyed property. As the riots continue, Bob realizes 
that if he finds the alleged rapist, the riots will cease 
and much pain and suffering will be stopped. Unfortu-
nately, there is no evidence available to lead to the rap-
ist. Bob realizes that he must make a tough choice for 
the sake of his town. He falsifies some evidence, which 
leads to the arrest and conviction of an innocent man. 
Once the man is captured, the riots stop and people are 
no longer being hurt and killed. Bob is relieved.  
Convicting an innocent man, as bad is it is, is not of greater 
moral significance than saving numerous innocent people from 
pain, suffering, and death at the hands of others. Notice that 
this is consistent with claiming that convicting an innocent 
man is very bad or even equally bad with allowing many inno-
cent people to suffer and die at the hands of others. My claim is 
simply that convicting an innocent man is not of greater moral 
significance than saving numerous people from pain, suffering 
and death at the hands of others.  Thus, in convicting an in-
nocent man, Bob does not sacrifice something of greater moral 
significance. Therefore, according to (RP3), what Bob does is 
morally permissible. But it is clearly impermissible to do what 
Bob has done. (RP3) must therefore be false.3 
2  The Riot is a slightly modified version of a case originally given by 
H.J. McCloskey, as quoted by James Rachels (2015).
3  One might object that what Bob does is permissible on some ver-
sions of Utilitarianism, such as Act Utilitarianism. There is room for 
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An objector might reply by suggesting that the reason we 
judge that Bob’s actions are wrong is that Bob has violated the 
innocent man’s rights. For example, one might think that the 
innocent man has certain moral rights that preclude intention-
al, wrongful criminal convictions. But this suggests a morally 
relevant difference between the innocent man and the animals 
used in experiments: the innocent man has certain (moral) 
rights that animals do not have, at least according to the pro-
experimentation position. Thus, (RP3) should be rejected as in-
adequate for not taking into account the notion of rights. What 
we learned from The Riot suggests that we should instead ac-
cept the following rescue principle:
(RP4): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, it is morally permissible to do it, un-
less doing it sacrifices something of greater moral sig-
nificance and violates someone’s (moral) rights. 
(RP4) gives us the intuitively correct result that Bob’s ac-
tions in the Riot are impermissible. Notice, too, that when ap-
plied to the case of animal experimentation, (RP4) entails that 
performing some animal experiments is permissible since it 
disagreement, however. A committed Act Utilitarian may argue that, 
in the real world, framing an innocent person likely does not lead to 
the best balance of pain or pleasure or the best balance of preference 
satisfaction over preference frustration. For in the real world, framing 
an innocent person for a crime means letting the real culprit run free, 
potentially leading him or her to commit more terrible crimes. Fur-
thermore, in the real world it is likely that Bob’s actions would later 
be found out, creating very bad consequences, such as a deep public 
mistrust in the police force and other government institutions. 
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does not sacrifice something of greater moral significance, nor 
does it violate anyone’s (moral) rights.4 
But consider the following counter-example to (RP4): Lisa 
and Sarah are two adults suffering from liver failure due to 
different genetic diseases. Both are equally sick, yet Lisa has 
been on the waiting list 4 months longer than Sarah. Accord-
ing to the state of the waiting list, the next liver available will 
go to Lisa, since she has been waiting longer than Sarah. But 
now imagine that unbeknownst to Sarah, her brother Oscar, an 
infamous and extremely talented computer hacker, breaks into 
the liver transplant waiting list database and switches the posi-
tions of Sarah and Lisa, thus making Sarah the next recipient 
of the next available liver transplant. When the next available 
liver becomes available, Sarah receives it. 
With respect to this imaginary case, let me point two things 
out. First, Oscar’s act of switching Lisa and Sarah’s positions 
on the waiting list does not seem to result in the sacrifice of 
anything of greater moral importance. After all, the well-being 
and lives of Sarah and Lisa are equally valuable, so by giv-
ing Sarah priority over Lisa, Oscar has not thereby sacrificed 
something of greater moral significance than saving Sarah’s 
life. Secondly, since nobody has a (positive) moral right to re-
ceive an organ transplant (and in particular, a transplanted liv-
er), Oscar’s actions did not violate any of Lisa’s (moral) rights. 
4  Of course, a defender of the rights-based approach to animal ex-
perimentation might argue that animals do in fact have moral rights 
that preclude the permissibility of animal experimentation (Regan 
1983, 2012). But since I am not assuming that animals have moral 
rights for the purposes of explicating the merits of the rescue ap-
proach, I will not pursue this line of argument. 
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Despite these two observations, we should all agree that what 
Oscar did was wrong. It follows that (RP4) is false.  
There is an important objection to consider here. One plau-
sible explanation for the wrongness of Oscar’s action is that, 
given her time on the waiting list, Lisa deserved to be given the 
transplant ahead of Sarah. Thus, Oscar did something wrong 
because he acted unjustly towards Lisa by not giving her what 
she deserved, namely, to be given the next available liver. This 
suggests that our new principle should be formulated thusly:
(RP5): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening, it is morally permissible to do it, un-
less doing it (i) sacrifices something of greater moral 
significance, and (ii) either results in the violation of 
someone’s rights or fails to give some morally consid-
erable being what it deserves (or both). 
(RP5) looks quite plausible. It is able to accommodate the 
result that Oscar’s actions in the above case are impermissible, 
and it also accommodates our judgments in the Riot and a vari-
ety of other rescue cases. There is however, a fatal problem for 
defenders of animal experimentation who want to use (RP5) 
as a moral justification for animal experimentation. The origin 
of this problem is found in the reasonable pro-experimentation 
position. Recall that among the claims essential to the reason-
able pro-experimentation position are the following two:
(1) Animals have interests (at least in not suffering, and 
perhaps others as well), which may be adversely af-
fected either by research performed on them or by the 
conditions under which they live before, during, and 
after the research; and 
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(2) The adverse effect on animals’ interests is morally 
relevant, and must be taken into account when decid-
ing whether or not a particular program of animal re-
search is justified or must be modified or abandoned.
Since animal interests matter morally, it is plausible that ani-
mals deserve to have at least some of those interests respected 
by human beings. Now consider the interest animals have in 
not experiencing pain and suffering. Qua morally considerable 
beings whose interests in not suffering matters, it is very plau-
sible that animals deserve some minimal amount of respect, 
which involves not purposely inflicting them with pain and suf-
fering. Such a view seems to be consistent with the reasonable 
pro-experimentation position.  But we can now see that (RP5) 
does not entail that animal experimentation is permissible, 
since animal experimentation fails to give the animals used 
what they deserve as morally considerable beings, namely: 
freedom from purposely inflicted pain and suffering. There-
fore, although (RP5) is an independently plausible principle, 
it does not entail that animal experimentation is permissible. 
One could object that animal experiments do not fail to give 
animals what they deserve, because research animals do de-
serve to be experimented on for human benefit. But this po-
sition is utterly implausible and has no viable justification in 
its favor. What could make it true that animals deserve to be 
inflicted with pain and suffering? One obvious suggestion is 
retributive: animals have done something that deserves pun-
ishment involving the infliction of pain and suffering. But it is 
false that research animals have done something that merits a 
punishment involving purposely-inflicted pain and suffering. 
Therefore, it is false that animals deserve to be inflicted with 
pain and suffering via painful experiments, and this means that 
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(RP5) entails that animal experimentation is morally imper-
missible. 
4. Is Animal Experimentation ever a Morally Per-
missible Form of Rescue?
So far we have yet to find any rescue principle that is both in-
dependently plausible and entails that animal experimentation 
is morally permissible. One might wonder, then, whether there 
are any rescue principles of this kind. My goal in this paper 
was not to settle the question of whether there is at least one 
independently plausible rescue principle that justifies animal 
experimentation. Rather, my task was to show how difficult it 
is to justify animal experimentation when we conceive of it as 
a form of rescue. The last section illustrated just how difficult 
it is. 
There are, to be sure, rescue principles that entail that ani-
mal experimentation is morally permissible. Consider the fol-
lowing:
(RP6): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening to some human being, it is permissible 
to do it, even if doing so involves causing extensive 
pain, suffering, and death to non-human animals. 
Although there are a variety of problems with (RP6), let me 
highlight a few. First, (RP6) treats species membership as if it 
is, by itself, morally relevant. In doing so, it commits itself to 
a position known as Speciesism (a term first coined by Rich-
ard Ryder), which involves “the unjustified preference for the 
interests of human beings over other species” (Bass 2012, 85; 
see also Singer 1975 & 2009b; Steinbock 1978). The problem 
with Speciesism is that it says that a being’s species member-
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ship, and not some other morally relevant property such as 
consciousness or sentience, gives that being’s interests greater 
weight than the interests of a being that belongs to some oth-
er species. On this view, the interests of human beings have 
greater weight than the interests of other non-human animals 
simply because human beings belong to the species Homo sa-
pien. But there is no good reason to think that belonging to 
the species Homo sapien by itself makes one’s interests count 
more than the interests of other species. Thus, this bias against 
non-human animals on the basis of species membership alone 
is arbitrary and “no more defensible than racism or any other 
form of arbitrary discrimination” (Singer 1975, 76). Even if the 
Speciesist position is amended to say that the interests of the 
human species have more weight than the interests of other 
species because humans have the capacity for rationality, this 
move is subject to the well-known problem of marginal cases 
(see Norcross 2012; Cohen 1986). Thus, (RP6) implausibly 
treats being a Homo sapien and being a non-Homo Sapien as if 
both properties mattered morally in themselves, and as a result 
commits itself to the implausible position of Speciesism. 
Second, (RP6) entails that we are permitted to treat non-hu-
man animals in any way we please in order to rescue some hu-
man being from undergoing something bad. However, in addi-
tion to being incompatible with the reasonable pro-experimen-
tation position, accepting (RP6) is independently implausible 
because it is consistent with the permissibility of clearly abhor-
rent behavior. Imagine you are the owner of an adult cat. Your 
2-year old daughter is running around the living room, and you 
see your cat running towards her, attempting to pounce on her 
and knock her over as a playful gesture. You know that your 
daughter will not be seriously injured if she is knocked down 
by the cat; she might get a small bruise on her arm or a small 
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cut on her face, yet her getting injured is a bad thing. (RP6) has 
the implication that it is permissible for you to do anything you 
like to the cat in order to prevent your daughter from incurring 
a small bruise or cut. For example, you could snatch the cat and 
break its bones. Or snatch up the cat and throw it against the 
wall as hard as you can. But clearly such behavior would be 
morally abhorrent and impermissible. Therefore (RP6) is false. 
What strikes us as wrong about (RP6) is that it renders per-
missible the infliction of unnecessary pain and suffering on 
animals. But surely there is a more moderate principle, which 
is consistent with the pro-experimentation position, and does 
not permit clearly abhorrent behavior. Consider, then, the fol-
lowing:
(RP7): If it is in our power to prevent something bad 
from happening to some human being, it is morally 
permissible to do it, unless doing so involves causing 
unnecessary pain, suffering, and death to non-human 
animals.
This principle is more plausible than (RP6). It approves of 
only those animal experiments that involve painful interven-
tions that are absolutely necessary as a means to curing or alle-
viating diseases and illnesses in human beings. It also appears 
that (RP7) entails the permissibility of animal experiments that 
do not involve unnecessary animal pain and suffering. 
The problem is that (RP7) is not independently plausible for 
at least two reasons. First, it, like (RP6), takes species member-
ship to be, by itself, morally relevant. But species membership 
is not by itself morally relevant. Second and more importantly, 
built into (RP7) is the assumption that members of the human 
species may permissibly inflict necessary pain and suffering 
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on members of other animal species in order to alleviate human 
suffering. But it is unclear what could justify this latter claim, 
especially if species membership is not by itself morally rel-
evant. It’s true that human beings have the resources and intel-
ligence to dominate other species and use them in experiments. 
But the mere fact that humans have this ability does nothing to 
morally justify the practice of inflicting pain and suffering on 
members of other species in order to alleviate suffering in the 
human species. 
A defender of the reasonable pro-experimentation position 
might argue that the lives of the members of the human spe-
cies are more important, morally speaking, given their greater 
capacities for emotion, rationality, and higher moral thinking. 
Therefore, it is justified for the human species to inflict pain 
and suffering on non-human animals in order to cure or al-
leviate human suffering.  But this suggestion faces a serious 
problem. Imagine in the future that an ultra-intelligent alien 
race is discovered in a nearby galaxy, and that given the pop-
ulation growth on earth, many human beings are given paid 
passages to live amongst the aliens in the nearby galaxy. Now 
the aliens in question are in every respect superior to human 
beings. They are much smarter, quicker, stronger, and sophis-
ticated with respect to every aspect of their lives. Additionally, 
they have a more robust capacity for emotion, and are quite 
emotionally sensitive in many respects. Now imagine that 
many aliens suffer from genetic diseases that are painful and 
debilitating. In order to find cures for these diseases, the aliens 
realize that they must perform painful experiments on some 
research subjects. Given that many human beings live amongst 
them, the aliens decide to use the humans as research subjects. 
They reason as follows: “although it is regrettable that we use 
human beings in painful experiments, the lives of the members 
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of the alien species are more important, morally speaking, giv-
en their greater capacities for emotion, rationality, and higher 
moral thinking. Therefore, it is justified for the alien species to 
inflict pain and suffering on human beings in order to cure or 
alleviate alien suffering.”
Of course, we would all be horrified if the aliens used hu-
man beings as research subjects in painful experiments. But 
the reasoning they use to justify the experimentation is the 
same reasoning used to justify the claim that the human spe-
cies may permissibly inflict necessary pain and suffering on 
non-human animals in order to cure human diseases. Since it 
is clearly wrong for the aliens to use the humans in painful 
experiments for their benefit, it follows that we must reject the 
claim that because human lives are more important, morally 
speaking, it is morally justified for the human species to inflict 
necessary pain and suffering on non-human animals in order to 
cure or alleviate human suffering. Until a better reason is given 
to support the latter claim, (RP7) remains an independently 
implausible principle that cannot justify the practice of animal 
experimentation. 
In this section I have discussed two rescue principles that 
seem to straightforwardly entail the permissibility of animal 
experimentation. However, as we have seen, these principles 
are not independently plausible and should thus be rejected. 
5. Conclusion
In this article I referred to animal experimentation as a form 
of rescue. Since the morality of rescue cases are governed by 
rescue principles, I explored whether there are principles of 
rescue that are both independently plausible and such that they 
entail that animal experimentation is a morally permissible 
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practice. What I have argued in the paper is that it is quite dif-
ficult to develop an independently plausible principle of rescue 
that also entails that animal experimentation is morally permis-
sible. I concluded by considering a principle – namely (RP7) – 
that entails that animal experimentation is morally permissible. 
However, I argued that this principle is independently implau-
sible because it assumes that species membership is by itself 
morally relevant and because the reasoning on which the prin-
ciple depends turns out to have an unacceptable consequence, 
as illustrated by the case of the ultra-intelligent alien race. 
I have not shown in this paper that there is no plausible 
principle of rescue that entails that animal experimentation is 
permissible. However, I think I have done enough to suggest 
that, when conceived as a form of rescue, it is quite difficult 
to justify the moral permissibility of animal experimentation. 
What my analysis suggests is that proponents of animal experi-
mentation, especially those committed to the reasonable pro-
experimentation position articulated in §2, face the following 
challenge: put forth a principle of rescue which is both inde-
pendently plausible and entails that animal experimentation is 
morally permissible. If proponents of the pro-experimentation 
position are unable to do this, this is good evidence that animal 
experimentation cannot be justified by being a morally permis-
sible form of rescue.1
Endnotes
1 Many thanks to Cheryl Abbate for her comments on this paper.
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